Written by Edward Archibald, Social Protection Expert and STAAR Political Economy Lead, in collaboration with the STAAR Facility.

 

Humanitarian aid and social protection in conflict settings inevitably means competition over resources. A multitude of national and international actors are involved in the design and distribution of aid. And each of these actors have their own interests as to when, where, why, or how they would like to see financial resources allocated. The reality is that these interests are highly unlikely to be fully aligned or coherent.

Acting according to interests can lead to both harmful and constructive effects. No agency or person, including international actors at both the organisational and individual level, is necessarily immune from interests or incentives that may lead to adverse impacts when acted upon. The list of potential undesirable outcomes is both depressingly long and familiar: exacerbation of violence, poor value for money, exclusion of deserving populations, bypassing of local actors, protracted delays in the development of local systems, among others. Of course, simply having interests is not always a negative, and aligning actions with those interests can and does lead to positive development outcomes.

 

Resisting reform efforts to maintain the status quo

Reforms may face extensive resistance where national actors benefit from the status quo. Efforts to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of social protection or humanitarian assistance in conflict settings could therefore be actively stymied. For instance, those who are politically connected might benefit from patronage opportunities such as contracts for supply, transport, or storage of food aid; or from being able to control which communities or households are enrolled in development initiatives.

It’s not just national actors; the interests and incentives of international actors can also mean that reforms are actively undermined. Many international actors benefit from privileges afforded by the status quo – whether financial (e.g., salary, R&R, school fees, job security, promotion opportunities, etc.), or non-financial (e.g. kudos from friends and family, a perceived sense of self-worth). Is this why the carefully calibrated and progressive strategies adopted by the headquarters of international organisations do not always align with the actions of personnel at country level? Employees with a personal stake in maintaining the current system might be reluctant to implement an HQ strategy that undermines the need for their role.

Policy and programmatic reforms face the risk of failure in the absence of full commitment from national elites. Likewise, passive or active resistance from international actors can also lead to the failure of a sound reform. This is not to say that national or international actors cannot or should not foster reform initiatives that seek to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of social protection and humanitarian assistance in conflict settings. But the graveyard of development initiatives is littered with policy documents written by external consultants that are destined never to be implemented. And many well-intentioned donor-supported reforms have led only to isomorphic mimicry.

Perhaps an important constraint is that many donors lack access to local expertise on political constraints to reforms. International actors with an interest in supporting policy reforms need to be able to access – and then use, of course – practical and actionable analysis from local experts on political constraints to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of social protection or humanitarian assistance. This is an enormous gap at present.

It is also all too common to see a lack of consensus among international elites on what reforms are required. While there is often wholehearted agreement on “we cannot still be doing the same thing in 5-10 years’ time”, there is also a huge reluctance to take the first courageous steps towards achieving a vision of radical change. Again, there are strong incentives to stymy reforms that could reduce the rationale for an agency’s or an individual’s presence. But is it not a goal of all international actors to do oneself out of a job?

Major donor aid agencies – such as the UK, EU and US – do not take enough responsibility for bringing international actors together to reach consensus on reform opportunities and priorities. Donors that fund both sectors can adopt important leadership roles to mediate a path forward. They have the means and the opportunity: they fund the actors and they sit on the Executive Boards. Do they have the motivation? What seems to be missing is the impetus for thoughtful and joined-up engagement at country, HQ and board levels. The different internal funding channels for development and humanitarian spending are certainly not enablers.

 

What needs to be done?

Donors and implementers should pool resources and invest in high-quality open access political economy analysis which will help all actors to understand and work within the local political and economic context. Having political economy analysis as a public good will also help middle management demonstrate the risks and opportunities to their senior management. Because donor-supported initiatives in conflict settings that ignore the political realities, and focus only on technical solutions, will likely fail and may even cause harm.

Pilot initiatives or reform proposals that do not gain traction with national elites over the short term should be suspended unless and until a favourable window of opportunity arises. Otherwise it is just throwing good money after bad.

Major international donors such as the UK, EU, and US should take greater responsibility for their status and adopt a leadership role at country level. These donors can and should build a consensus on reform priorities in social protection and humanitarian action that will be viable within the local political and economic context. Having a joined-up internal funding stream for both development and humanitarian aid is probably an important enabler.

International implementing organisations also need to take greater responsibility – in particular for ensuring closer alignment between the strategies espoused at headquarters and the actions of personnel at country level. This applies to both technical staff and senior management.

Social Protection Building Blocks: 
  • Policy
    • Expenditure and financing
    • Governance and coordination
Social Protection Approaches: 
  • Social protection systems
Cross-Cutting Areas: 
  • Humanitarian assistance
Countries: 
  • Global
The views presented here are the author's and not socialprotection.org's